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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

2 March 1978

CONTENTS

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25X1

TURKEY: Sharp Reaction to Foreign Criticism of
Narcotics Control Effort 4

PAKISTAN: Delay in Utilization of Foreign
Aid. 7

PAKISTAN: Failure To Raid Narcotics Labs. 8



25X6

COLOMBIA: New President, No Drug Control? 12

NOTEWORTHY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Pakistan. 15

2. Afghanistan 16

3. Turkey. 17


4. Guatemala 23

5. Colombia. 30

BRIEFS

INTERESTING READING. 37

This publication is prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center
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narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.



SECRET

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1

TURKEY: Sharp Reaction to Foreign Criticism of
Narcotics Control Effort

Turkish officials have reacted sharply to charges that Turkish authorities are not acting effectively in trying to stem heroin trafficking through Turkey to Europe. Turkish complaints were primarily directed at the comments made recently at the meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) held in Geneva.

Turkish officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have complained to the US Ambassador in Ankara that Turkey has been singled out for criticism in its narcotics control activities. They emphasized that Turkey has been very successful in controlling its poppy harvest, a point, however, that was not at issue during the CND meeting. Officials added that responsible authorities are working hard to end the use of Turkish nationals as drug couriers and that while information passed to the Turkish National Police might be useful, it was not sufficiently "concrete" to permit immediate action.

The Turks appear to have overreacted to what was originally a mild criticism of their narcotics-control efforts. They feel considerable pride in their successful program to monitor poppy harvests and tend to view criticism from abroad as part of a continuing effort to sully their reputation. While recognizing the problem of Turks transporting heroin into Western Europe, officials claim that the total volume of the heroin being moved through these channels is, in fact, relatively small.

The primary difficulty for Turkish officials attempting to stem the flow of heroin transiting Turkey is their inability to devote enough trained personnel to the task. Preoccupied with the serious rise in domestic political violence, Turkish authorities are being distracted from

2 March 1978

SECRET

SECRET

their efforts to establish adequate customs checks for the thousands of Turkish nationals who work in Germany and frequently travel between Turkey and Germany and the many commercial trucks that pass through Turkey to Europe.

25X1

2 March 1978

SECRET

SECRET



2 March 1978

6
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PAKISTAN: Delay in Utilization of Foreign Aid

According to Raoof Ali, the Chairman of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, a major United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) development project has been delayed because the Pakistani Government has not appropriated counterpart funds. UNFDAC is providing \$3.1 million to assist in roadbuilding, crop improvement, and irrigation in Buner, a remote area where as much as a third of Pakistan's illicit opium is now produced.

Ali said he had held up work on the project because, without maintenance funds, any construction is likely to fall into disrepair. He believes, however, that the project has the personal support of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq, and that funds will be forthcoming soon.

Ali also said that funds provided by the US go unused because he is unwilling to spend money except as part of an effective overall plan. He lays the blame on the government of the province in which the opium is produced, claiming that its lack of cooperation has made effective planning and implementation difficult. He was not optimistic about any improvement.

The imposition of military government in Pakistan does not seem to have improved the narcotics situation. Few of the politicians probably were being paid to protect narcotics, but most placed a low priority on narcotics control and were unwilling to upset their constituents in the growing areas by strict enforcement. The military government seems to place no higher priority on narcotics and seems as unwilling to stir up trouble in the growing areas. Moreover, most of the decisions about narcotics control were always made by civil servants, and the same men are still in the same jobs.

25X1

2 March 1978

7
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PAKISTAN: Failure To Raid Narcotics Labs

Early this year, the US Ambassador in Islamabad informed Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq that narcotics labs--at least one of which produces heroin--are operating in Pakistan. Zia promised to move against them promptly. In early February, the Ambassador reminded Zia of his promise and was told that an operation "must be carefully planned" and that the matter was being pursued to ensure the "successful implementation" of the raids. Raoof Ali, the Chairman of the Narcotics Control Board, later told the Ambassador that the government wanted to make sure all its forces were ready for both the raids and any disturbances which might follow. The State Department has expressed our concern to the Pakistani Ambassador, who has promised to tell Islamabad.

So far, there have been no raids, and the lab operators, apparently tipped off by contacts in the government, have moved their operations.

Three of the labs located by US DEA sources were in the North-West Frontier Province, where government control is almost nonexistent in some areas, and where efforts to enforce the law can spark a tribal rebellion.

The labs, however, were not in particularly remote areas, and Raoof Ali apparently believes the military has exaggerated the difficulties of the operation. He says he pressed the local commander for prompt action but was told that 10 to 30 days preparation would be necessary. A fourth lab was located in Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, where a raid would seem to involve no major police or political problem, but apparently nothing was done there either.


Zia, both because of his desire for good relations with the US and because of his personal commitment to raising Pakistan's moral standards, is almost certainly in favor of strict enforcement of narcotics laws.

2 March 1978

SECRET

SECRET

25X6



2 March 1978

9
SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1

COLOMBIA: New President, No Drug Control?

Over the past several months we have reported instances of narcotics related corruption among officials of the Colombian Government. Much of the controversy surrounding this politically sensitive issue has centered on the Liberal Party presidential candidate, Julio Cesar Turbay.

Julio Cesar Turbay, a controversial politician with alleged connections to the Colombian "mafia" and the country's numerous drug trafficking networks, won his party's presidential nomination this week.

Turbay, who has been referred to in the domestic press as the "trafficker's candidate," is heavily favored to win the June presidential elections--a development that some officials in both the United States and Colombia believe will adversely affect bilateral drug control relations. Even if the worst suspicions of Turbay's alleged corruption were true, there are political limitations on the extent to which he could abuse the powers of his office in support of his trafficking clientele.



Julio Cesar Turbay

Turbay and his family have a reputation for contraband smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and associating with members of organized crime--accusations frequently made about many of the country's prominent figures. These charges and other allegations of political impropriety on Turbay's part have occasionally been raised

2 March 1978

SECRET

SECRET

in the Colombia media. Indeed, there is considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting that many of the charges are true--particularly those that claim his presidential campaign is being partly financed by contributions from drug traffickers who expect to receive "protection" after he is inaugurated on 7 August.

Narcotics trafficking has, in fact, become so lucrative and widespread in Colombia that it is virtually impossible to organize a political group that would not contain people who associate with drug smugglers. Colombia's traditional ruling elite is increasingly concerned over the influence that politically and economically powerful drug organizations can exert.

The issue for US drug enforcement officials is not the existence of narcotics related corruption in Colombia, but whether such corruption will defeat Washington's drug control efforts. More specifically, the question is not whether Turbay is guilty or innocent of the charges, but whether he will continue the drug control cooperation initiated during the Lopez administration.

Considering the amount of publicity, both domestic and international, surrounding Colombia's role in the world narcotics market and the involvement of high-level Colombian officials in that trafficking, Turbay may feel constrained to take stringent measures--if for no other reason than to silence his critics. Moreover, drug control machinery at the working level which has been set into motion by Lopez and Attorney General Serrano, should be at least partially insulated--once it is fully operational--from executive manipulation.

Between now and the time Turbay is inaugurated, Attorney General Serrano's new narcotics unit should be activated. This special force, authorized under the recent Judicial Reform law, will operate on a 50 million peso (\$1.3 million) budget that was personally approved by President Lopez. Applicants for the narcotics unit are being individually screened by Serrano, a dedicated and honest official who has cooperated fully with US Embassy and Drug Enforcement Administration representatives.

2 March 1978

SECRET

The Attorney General's narcotics unit must begin operations soon and register some initial successes in order to guarantee the group's continued existence. Serrano, who probably will leave office before the year is out, believes he will have sufficient time to establish his organization. He has noted, however, that while Colombia's antinarcotics commitment would continue regardless of the election results, the "implementation" of that commitment might vary, depending on the amount of resources future governments are willing to employ.

Measured against the supportive efforts of a concerned individual like Lopez, Turbay's first test on drug control may be his willingness to extend a helping hand to the new narcotics unit. If there are problems integrating members of the various enforcement and intelligence agencies into an effective force, or if there are budgetary and financial difficulties, the Attorney General's organization will be impotent. If the group disbands altogether, narcotics enforcement in Colombia will fall to several disparate, uncoordinated and ineffective agencies. If that scenario materializes, US drug control interests will be affected.

Assuming he is actually involved with, or even indebted to, some of the drug networks, Turbay can personally protect his drug-smuggling friends and take a cut of narcotics money and still be as effective a politician as other Latin American leaders who enrich themselves through corrupt practices while in office. In his executive role, however, Turbay will have to take a strong stand on drug control in order to prevent further damage to his reputation and that of his country.

Even if Turbay is corrupt, traffickers will continue to be arrested and drugs will still be seized. Statistical evidence will suggest the drug control effort is being satisfactorily pursued. Even if the reverse proves true and Turbay is single-minded in his determination to wipe out drug smuggling in Colombia, only limited successes can be achieved.

As long as Colombian traffickers have access to sources of supply in Peru and Bolivia, the flow of narcotics will be impossible to stop. The law of supply and demand, at least as it applies to narcotics, is not just an economic principle, it is an inexorable force over which officials in Colombia are finding they have little control.

25X1

2 March 1978

SECRET

NOTEWORTHY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing economic and political situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

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PAKISTAN: Unrest Grows

Civil disorder appears to be once again on the increase in Pakistan. Following the military coup last July, there were a few clashes between police and political demonstrators, but the military government's first six months were unusually quiet. This year, however, there have already been several serious incidents:

- On 2 January, at least 12 strikers were killed and eight police injured in a clash in Multan.
- On 12 and 13 February, there was a general strike and rioting in Karachi to protest the inability of the police to solve an especially brutal kidnaping murder.
- On 16 February, there was a serious clash between rival Muslim sects in Karachi.
- On 17 February, police stormed television transmission centers in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta to oust striking employees.
- On 20 February, another religious clash in Karachi left six dead.

None of these incidents is directly related to the political situation in Pakistan, but they do reflect

2 March 1978

15
SECRET

SECRET

widespread discontent. At the same time, the violence is eroding the military government's reputation for ensuring law and order whatever its other defects. Politicians have already made tentative efforts to exploit the disturbances, and it could be only a matter of time before some of them make a serious effort to return violence to the Pakistani political process. [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN: Report on the Assassination of the Planning Minister

The Afghan Government has announced the results of its investigation of the murder last November of Planning Minister Khurram. According to the government and the killer's confession, the murder was part of a larger plot directed at President Daoud and several other ministers. A group of "reactionaries"--some of them connected with the ultra-rightwing Muslim Brotherhood were responsible and had financial and moral support from "aliens." The assassin was trained in an unnamed foreign country.

The plotters hoped to use Khurram's car to gain access to the presidential palace. Killing Khurram was an alternate plan if the main plan did not work.

The government has probably charged the right man with Khurram's murder, although there is some doubt about that. There is no way--and there may never be a way--to separate fact from fiction in the remainder of the report.

There are rightwing extremists who probably would like to kill Daoud, and the government may have uncovered an authentic plot. There is fairly good evidence, however, that the investigators decided that the murder was part of a conspiracy even before they had collected any evidence.

2 March 1978

SECRET

Daoud may be using the murder as an excuse to crack down on rightist extremists, even though they had nothing to do with the killing. One version of the murder--not necessarily any more accurate than the government's--is that the family of Khurram's brother-in-law, who had recently either committed suicide or been murdered, hired the killer to settle a family dispute.

If the Muslim Brotherhood--an international organization--was involved, there could well have been foreign participation. But the attempt to lay part of the blame on foreigners may be designed both to play down the hostility toward Daoud in Afghanistan and to discredit his opponents by making them foreign agents.

The unnamed foreign country presumably is Pakistan. The Afghans, however, do not believe or claim that the Pakistani Government was involved, merely that alien reactionaries were operating in Pakistan. Pakistan presumably was not named because Kabul did not want to endanger prospects for a further improvement in relations with Islamabad. [REDACTED]

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Electric Power Shortages Add to Turkey's Energy Problems


On several occasions during the past year, Iraq stopped the flow of oil in its pipeline to Turkey because the latter failed to pay its oil bills. Now Turkey's low reserves of foreign exchange and its delinquency in paying foreign debts have evoked the ire of another of its energy suppliers, Bulgaria. During the first four days of 1978, Bulgaria halved electricity transmission to Turkey, further cutting Turkey's already inadequate electricity supply.

Lack of foreign exchange, power plant construction delays, and inadequate system maintenance have created serious power shortages in Turkey. Routine daily power

2 March 1978

17
SECRET

Selected Components of the Electric System



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SECRET

2 March 1978

SECRET

cutoffs have constrained industrial output, economic growth, and employment. In addition, Turkey's growing dependence on Bulgaria and the Soviet Union for quick fixes of electric power has prompted concern that Ankara may be pushed to pay for these energy imports politically as well as in US dollars.

Recent Power Problems

Turkish demand for electricity first exceeded domestic supply by a small amount in 1972. Since then the shortfall has grown rapidly, reaching 820 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 1977. It is expected to reach 1,500 GWh this year, or nearly 7 percent of estimated 1978 consumption.

Despite the shortfalls, blackouts did not become frequent in Ankara until the winter of 1976-77. In June 1977, unscheduled power outages of a few minutes to several hours became daily two-hour blackouts. By September 1977, three-hour blackouts during the day, Monday through Saturday, were standard. Blackouts of three to five hours are now routine in most large Turkish cities. Istanbul is without power for five hours each day, except Sunday.

According to officials of the former Demirel government, scheduled power outages last year cut GNP by an estimated \$460 million, equal to about one percentage point of real growth. In 1977, the economy grew 5 percent; 8 percent had been planned. Continuing and more severe power problems this year may cost the economy an estimated \$800 million in lost output, shaving perhaps one to two percentage points off the government's projected 4.5 percent GNP growth rate.

Underlying Problems

Turkey's power problems do not stem from a poor resource base. It has extensive lignite reserves and a large hydropower potential. The heart of the problem is the government's failure to complete several major power projects on schedule. Poor planning, mismanagement, and balance-of-payments difficulties have contributed to the slippage.

2 March 1978

SECRET

Turkey's foreign payments problems have been especially troublesome. Purchases of key project components, such as generators and turbines, have had to wait until the government accumulates foreign exchange or arranges new loans abroad. Thus, financing for purchases of equipment in Western Europe for the Karakaya hydroelectric project was only arranged last October. Although Karakaya was originally intended to start production in the early 1980s, the government now expects it to come on line in 1985; this may be optimistic.

Maintenance problems have compounded those created by lagging construction schedules. The government-owned Turkish Electric Company has had trouble obtaining foreign exchange to import materials and equipment needed to keep the national power grid in good repair. A recent study by the Turkish mechanical engineers' union estimated that electricity transmission losses are at least 50 percent higher than they should be because of the poor condition of the grid.

The tight electric power supply balance has put an additional strain on generating capacity, increasing the chances of equipment failure. At the same time, Turkey has no cushion of reserve capacity to soften the consequences of a breakdown. A year ago, daily countrywide blackouts were precipitated by the breakdown of two of the four turbine units at the Keban Dam generating plant and by a fire at a major power plant in Istanbul.

Remedial Measures

The long-term solution to Turkey's electric power problems is to accelerate completion of power plants already under construction, but this will not add to the power supply until the early to mid-1980s. Moreover, success of the current expansion program rests on Ankara's ability to borrow abroad. Last October, the government negotiated a \$250 million loan with a consortium of Swiss banks to finance imports of turbine generators and machinery for the Karakaya hydro project. Ankara hopes to obtain an additional \$100 million loan for this project from the World Bank. Nevertheless, financing still has to be found for many other projects. Foreign exchange requirements for generating facilities

2 March 1978

SECRET

alone will amount to \$3.8 billion over the next 17 years. Additional financing would be needed to expand the transmission grid and to build two proposed nuclear power plants.

Turkey: Major Hydroelectric Power Projects

<u>Project</u>	<u>Capacity (MW)</u>	<u>Original Planned Completion Date</u>	<u>Estimated Completion Date</u>
Keban (Units 5-8)	620	1975	1980
Oymapinar	540	1976	1982-84
Aslantas	110	1976	1981
Karakaya (Units 1-6)	1,500	1982	1984-87
Karababa	1,400	1983-85	1984-86

To deal with the immediate situation, Ankara is encouraging conservation, although so far its program has been limited. In addition to mandatory blackouts, the government has reduced daily television broadcast time from six to four hours and doubled the price of electricity to 7 cents per kilowatt-hour.

Turkey is also relying on power imports from neighboring Bulgaria and the USSR to get by. Ankara signed electric power "exchange" agreements with these two countries in 1976. Because of Turkey's electric power supply problems, Ankara was not expected to transmit more than token amounts compared to the quantities it planned to import.

A transmission line from Batumi, USSR, to Hopa should be completed in July 1978, allowing the 10-year Soviet-

2 March 1978

SECRET

Turkish exchange agreement to be implemented. Under the agreement, the USSR will provide Turkey with 1,000 GWh annually for the first three years.

Ankara and Sofia started negotiations to renew and modify their power agreement in mid-1977, but have not yet settled on terms. Bulgaria supplied Turkey with 240 GWh of electricity in 1976 under a one-year exchange agreement. Under the 1977 agreement, Turkey drew 338 GWh of power while exporting 5.4 GWh to Bulgaria. Turkey wants Bulgaria to sign a two-year contract and to increase electric power exports to 620 GWh in 1978. The Bulgarians seem receptive provided they get a higher unit price; so far, Ankara has rejected demands for an increase.

Last month, Bulgaria reduced electric power transmissions to Turkey by half for several days. Although Bulgarian Energy Minister Tuderev blamed the cut on technical difficulties, he also prodded Ankara to pay its bills. Turkey had paid a \$9.5 million electricity bill to Bulgaria in November 1977. But by the end of the year Turkey still owed \$50 million for a variety of imports, probably including more than \$1 million for electricity.

The Bulgarian cutback in power exported to Turkey is probably related to electricity problems at home. In mid-January, the Bulgarian council of ministers called for temporary reductions in the use of electricity. Blackouts of two to five hours per day were scheduled for Sofia. Part of the problem seems to have been insufficient rainfall during the autumn, which caused some hydroelectric stations to operate below full capacity.

Although only 1.7 percent of the electricity Turkey consumed in 1977 came from Bulgaria, the US Embassy in Ankara has judged Turkey's energy situation to be "so critical that the ability to deny even so small an amount presents a potent threat with an immediate impact." Bulgaria is trying to use this lever to extract a higher price from Turkey for each kilowatt hour it buys in 1978.

2 March 1978

SECRET

Turkey's susceptibility in this regard has aroused suspicions that Bulgaria may be using its position as an electricity supplier to extract political concessions from Ankara. Turkey's recent lack of enthusiasm for the convening of the second multilateral Balkan conference, which it had previously supported, could be an example of this. Ankara's shift on the Balkan conference brings it into line with the positions of Sofia and Moscow on this issue. Nevertheless, the US Embassy in Ankara has seen no indication that Bulgaria has tried to use electricity or any other economic lever to influence Turkey's position on Balkan cooperation. In fact, they have speculated that Turkey's preoccupation with issues involving relations with Bulgaria may have left Turkey little time for other matters. We have no evidence from any source to contradict or corroborate any of these hypotheses. In any case, the poor state of its electric power system will prove an increasing economic and possibly a political liability to Turkey for at least the next few years. [REDACTED]

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GUATEMALA: Presidential Election Preview

On 5 March, Guatemala will hold regularly scheduled elections for President, Vice President, all 61 members of the unicameral House of Deputies, and municipal councils and mayors. The three presidential candidates--Fernando Romeo Lucas, Ricardo Peralta Mendez, and Enrique Peralta Azurdia--are all present or former Army officers, and the race is close. None of the three is likely to take Guatemala down any new paths in domestic or foreign affairs. The changeover will not improve immediate prospects for a settlement of the Belize question, nor will it substantially affect US interests in Guatemala. The chances of an honest election are better than at any time in recent years but, by the same token, the results could well produce violence.

2 March 1978

23
SECRET

SECRET

The Guatemalan Political Milieu

Guatemala's political system is not a military dictatorship in the classic mold. Rather it is a curious and complex mixture of civilian and military political structures and processes, with the Army providing the pool of presidential candidates, defining the issues and procedures, and serving as the ultimate arbiter. The numerous political parties have considerable latitude to organize, form coalitions, choose candidates, strike bargains, and campaign publicly and in the uncensored media. The Congress is by no means a "rubberstamp" body, although the civilian political coalitions are, of course, not completely insulated from the realities of military pressure.

Guatemalan politics suffers at least as much from a deficiency in ideological substance as from military intervention. Civilian political associations are based more on personality and opportunism than on principle. This explains the realignment of the present ruling coalition to include forces that nominally support opposing ideologies.

Indeed, the leadership of the "rightwing" Democratic Institutional Party (PID), the moderate left Revolutionary Party (PR), and the leftist Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG) spent two years working out a union that would have been nearly unbeatable. They were able to resolve differences over ideologies and spoils, but eventually foundered on personality conflicts. Consequently, in this year's election the DCG and the PID/PR are running separate candidates. The far right, anti-Communist National Liberation Movement (MLN), which was part of the present government's coalition, is supporting the third candidate.

In such a system, campaign issues are secondary to candidates' personalities, political bargains, and raw power. When this situation is coupled with the fact that all three presidential nominees are present or former Army officers, the effect is widespread public apathy.

2 March 1978

24
SECRET

SECRET

Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia

Former Minister of Defense Lucas is the nominee of what is technically the ruling coalition: the "rightist" PID, the moderate left PR, and the conservative Central Aranista Organization (CAO), an unregistered grouping of supporters of former President Arana (1970-1974). Lucas probably has more support among military officers than either of his opponents, and may also be favored by most of the influential private business sector.

Despite these advantages, it seems Lucas has lost ground during the last few months. He has campaigned hard, but not well. The US Embassy has described Lucas as intellectually narrow, and lacking in vision, charisma, and sophistication.

Although he claims a "center-left" political orientation, he is in fact conservative and somewhat authoritarian.

Lucas' running mate, Francisco Villagran Kramer, a prominent and articulate leftist scholar and politician, has helped compensate for Lucas' poor campaign style. Moreover, Lucas may have the support of former Guatemala City mayor and leftist cult hero Manuel Colom Argueta. Colom is an ambitious plotter by nature

Lucas will face problems that are inherent in all coalitions--Villagran and Colom scare his rightist backers, while conservative CAO support may drive some PR elements to the Christian Democrats' camp.

Ricardo Peralta Mendez

As the candidate of the "outs," Peralta Mendez will have an extensive natural following. His party, the Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG), has never held power and therefore has no record to defend. The DCG

2 March 1978

SECRET

SECRET

enjoys broader popular support than any other Guatemalan party, and in fact won the 1974 presidential vote, only to be defrauded by former President Arana. The DCG may be stronger now than in 1974, since Peralta's two opponents should split the rightist vote. This will be partially offset if Colom's leftist FUR supports Lucas. (In 1974 Colom backed the DCG.)

Peralta Mendez is the most intelligent and open-minded of the three candidates. He is popular and received widespread public exposure while heading the government's recovery effort following the disastrous 1976 earthquake. He has been described in the press as a "Peruvian style soldier."

There is some doubt, however, that General Peralta has much support in the Army, particularly among the more influential general officers. He has a reputation for being devious, power-hungry, and vain. His opponent, Lucas, describes him as a "perennial plotter." Many conservative officers--as well as the business sector--also fear the "leftist tendencies" of the Christian Democrats and their two nominees, although Peralta's image as a "stuffed shirt" may be as important to the Guatemalan military mind as his political leanings.

Peralta Mendez' running mate, DCG founder and president Rene de Leon Scholtter, has been a liability. De Leon casts the ticket in the solidly "leftist" mold that frightens some military and business elements. Moreover, the fact that Peralta Mendez was denied his own choice of a running mate and was instead forced to accept de Leon has hurt his "macho" image. The two men may also dislike each other.

Enrique Peralta Azurdia

Following a coup he led to oust President Ydigoras in 1963, Peralta Azurdia--who is a second cousin of DCG nominee Peralta Mendez--was chief of government for three years. Although he has lived in the United States for the past 10 years, his campaign throughout Guatemala has resurrected memories of the honesty and efficiency

2 March 1978

SECRET

of his administration. Early in the campaign, the 69-year-old MLN candidate was not taken seriously, but he has come on in recent months through effective campaigning and sheer staying power. Given the law and order image of the conservative MLN, Peralta Azurdia also should profit from the recent upsurge in political violence and terrorism.

The Guatemalan constitution declares that anyone who has held the "office of President" for more than two years is ineligible to serve another term. Although this has not been a campaign issue--Peralta Azurdia used the title "Chief of Government"--presumably there would be a court challenge if he won the election.

The MLN is the most disciplined and well-organized party in Guatemala, but it does not have the broad popular support necessary to carry the day. Moreover, the party will be hurt if supporters of Alejandro Maldonado--a young moderate who campaigned hard but unsuccessfully for the party's nomination--defect to opposing candidates. Peralta Azurdia's young running mate, Hector Aragon Quinonez--first vice president of the Congress and a newcomer to politics--adds little to the ticket.

Implications and Prospects

It does not at present seem likely that any of the three candidates will be as successful as President Laugerud in:

- Promoting and negotiating a reasonable settlement on Belize.
- Holding the line on terrorism while improving respect for human rights.
- Advancing moderately progressive domestic programs.
- Maintaining friendly relations with the United States in light of human rights and arms policies that many Guatemalans consider unrealistic and discriminatory.

2 March 1978

SECRET

Given the need to establish a firm footing, none of the three candidates would be in a position to accept a compromise settlement of Belize for some time after assuming office. Moreover, despite assurances to US officials, Lucas will probably be less flexible than Laugerud; Peralta Azurdia will probably adopt the MLN's hard-line revanchist stand; Peralta Mendez will lack the military support to compromise. All will have to contend with fears of the Guatemalan right and many Army officers that an independent Belize will provide Cuba with a foothold in Central America.

Lucas and Peralta Azurdia would probably not deviate much from the status quo in general domestic and foreign policies. Peralta Mendez could be expected to give more emphasis to development and social integration programs, but congressional and economic constraints would dictate moderation.

US relations with Guatemala will probably not benefit from the changeover. All of the candidates will be inhibited publicly by Guatemalan nationalism, which has been stirred the past two years by US policies on human rights and arms sales. Given the Guatemalan perception of these policies as unfair and unrealistic, President Laugerud has been more forbearing than any of the possible successors is likely to be during the first year in office. There are no indications that economic relations and investment policies will be affected by the change in chief executives.

Prospects for an Honest Election

When no presidential candidate wins an absolute majority of the popular vote--and none has for the past 25 years--the House of Deputies chooses between the two leaders, traditionally picking the frontrunner. In 1974, Congress chose Laugerud after the Arana administration falsified the returns to show that he outpolled the DCG candidate. The Christian Democrats complained, but did not resort to violence.

There are widespread rumors that this year the Army--as well as the MLN leadership--will not permit Peralta Mendez to be elected president.

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2 March 1978

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Laugerud is conscious of the widespread suspicion that the government will engineer a Lucas victory, and he has repeatedly assured the public that the election will be honest and the results respected. Clearly he would like to leave office with a clean record. There is no evidence, for example, that government resources have been mobilized in behalf of Lucas' campaign.

All three candidates are friends of Laugerud.

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[REDACTED] Laugerud probably still believes that Peralta Mendez would make the best president, but perhaps does not fully trust his Christian Democrat supporters. The government coalition has the virtue of being a known quantity.

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The majority of general officers and key commanders probably favor Lucas, but in the absence of any apparent planning to stage a fraud, President Laugerud could possibly impose his will to recognize a legitimate vote count. One remaining question is whether Laugerud has yet decided that forcing acceptance of a Peralta Mendez victory would be best for the country.

The period between March and July will be one of considerable uncertainty, with the entire Guatemalan political structure in a lame duck mode. A Peralta Mendez victory would exacerbate that tension. A Lucas victory, on the other hand--particularly if Peralta Mendez runs a close second--could lead the DCG to cry fraud and, regardless of the truth, to resort to violent demonstrations. Peralta Mendez has repeatedly pressed Laugerud to promise an honest election and has held up the specter of civil strife.

2 March 1978

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Final Factors Affecting the Outcome

Although in choosing between the two presidential finalists, Congress has invariably picked the leading vote-getter, it is not legally bound to do so. Lucas' government coalition holds a slim majority of seats and could conceivably choose its own man over either Peralta. If Peralta Azurdia was not a finalist, MLN Deputies might also be party to such a scheme, rather than see the Christian Democrats gain the presidency. In this precedent-shattering circumstance, the DCG would probably resort to violent demonstrations, just as if it had been defrauded.

The popular vote should be close. While we predict Peralta Mendez and Lucas will run first and second respectively, it is not possible to foresee what will happen beyond that. Although the Christian Democratic candidate may gain a slim electoral mandate, Lucas--as the government coalition candidate--has the power structure in his favor.

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COLOMBIA: Election Results

Incomplete returns from Colombia's combined congressional election and Liberal Party presidential primary on Sunday show Julio Cesar Turbay with a commanding lead over former President Carlos Lleras Restrepo. They also indicate that the Liberals have won a sizable majority of the 311 seats in the Senate and Chamber of Representatives.

Lleras' hope for a surge of support at the last minute failed to materialize. The fact that the better disciplined political bosses supported Turbay was decisive. Although Lleras has not yet conceded, Turbay's headquarters has already claimed victory. Turbay will undoubtedly receive his party's nomination and will oppose Conservative Belisario Betancur in the presidential election on 4 June.

2 March 1978

SECRET

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Although Turbay is the early strong favorite to win the elections, both parties continue to be hampered by factionalism. The Liberal Party campaign was characterized by bitter rivalry. Charges of political corruption and family involvement in narcotics trafficking were exchanged by Lleras and Turbay. Betancur's chances will improve somewhat if the Liberal divisiveness continues after the primary.

The election also failed to establish a clear victor in the power struggle between the Pastrana and Alvaro Gomez factions of the Conservative Party. Both groups will continue to support Betancur in his presidential bid, although continued factionalism is likely to create further problems for his campaign.

In spite of measures to ensure "full democratic participation," some 70 percent of the electorate did not vote--a level of apathy far in excess of even traditionally poor Colombian turnouts. The high rate of abstention is due partly to the belief of many Colombians that they have little influence on a government whose policies are carried over from the National Front era, when Liberals and Conservatives maintained political parity. In addition, much of the electorate has no confidence in a leadership increasingly subject to charges of corruption and vote-buying.

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2 March 1978

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BRIEFS

MALDIVES: GOVERNMENT TIGHTENS NARCOTICS CONTROL LAWS.
The Republic of Maldives has instituted a law imposing stiff penalties for the possession, use, or sale of narcotics and hallucinogens. Illicit drugs have not been a problem in this remote group of atolls southwest of India, but the government may be trying to prepare for problems that could come with a continued growth of tourism in the Republic.

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2 March 1978

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PERU: NARCOTICS LAW APPROVED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

25X1 A member of the Peruvian Presidential Advisory Committee has confirmed that the Council of Ministers finally approved the long-delayed General Narcotics Law on 21 February. However, the law must be published in the Official Gazette before it becomes law. [REDACTED] the draft may still be undergoing final editorial changes. According to the Peruvian Attorney General, some of the terminology of the draft law approved by the Council has yet to be clarified before its publication. If this is all that remains to be done, there should be no further lengthy delay in promulgating the law, which could be an important landmark in the Peruvian narcotics control effort. Meanwhile, Peruvian authorities continue to make significant seizures of illicit cocaine paste and cocaine hydrochloride. During January, the Guardia Civil reportedly seized 557 kilograms of cocaine paste; this is almost twice as much as the organization seized during 1977. The Peruvians claim to have arrested 1,391 persons last year for narcotics trafficking activities. [REDACTED]

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2 March 1978

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EGYPT: CONCERN OVER OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN UPPER EGYPT. The Egyptian Government has become concerned over the cultivation of opium poppies in Upper Egypt and is seeking US assistance in eradication. Even though the area under cultivation is comparatively small, the Egyptian climate and the profitability of illicit opium traffic encourages its production. Egyptian narcotics control authorities estimate there are about 500,000 opium users in Egypt and that they consume from 3 to 6 tons of opium per year. They also report that opium poppy cultivation has increased in Egypt to meet the domestic demand which had been supplied from illicit Turkish opium prior to the Turkish ban in 1972.

According to DEA information, about 83 hectares, with a potential yield of 5 metric tons of raw opium, have been destroyed by Egyptian authorities since the first of January. The area of eradication is a 250 square mile area east of the Nile River about 275 miles south of Cairo. American observers in Egypt appear convinced that the Egyptians have identified and either destroyed or targeted all of the major cultivation sites in Egypt. The relatively small area under opium poppy cultivation is located on flat land along the Nile River which is close to sea level, in marked contrast to many of the areas in Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Burma where opium is grown at fairly high elevations often in mountainous regions. Many of the poppy fields in Egypt contained a mixed crop for concealment purposes. The Egyptian opium apparently was not destined for international markets, but rather to satisfy the domestic demand in Egypt. Egyptian narcotics authorities claim that half of the crop would have been consumed in Upper Egypt and the remainder would have been consumed by users in Cairo. Some of it may have found its way to neighboring countries, but amounts would have been insignificant. There have also been indications that Egyptian coastal areas may be involved in the

2 March 1978

SECRET

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narcotics transit trade, both from other areas of the Middle East and from South and Southeast Asia. The Egyptian Government continues to evince a strong political commitment in support of the international narcotics control program, although regional efforts are sometimes slow because of traditional antipathies, as between Egypt and Turkey.

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NEPAL: RUSSIAN BID FOR OPIUM DEAL. According to a reliable Embassy contact in Kathmandu, Soviet officials, last August, reiterated to the members of a visiting Nepalese trade delegation their interest in buying opium from Nepal. The source of this information claims he is certain of its validity because he had seen a memorandum on the subject prepared by members of the delegation. According to an earlier press editorial on the subject, appearing in a pro-Soviet newspaper in Kathmandu, the Russians told the Nepalese that the USSR was prepared to buy 25 to 30 metric tons of raw opium each year and even offered to send an adviser on opium production to Nepal. The Embassy notes that the recent account of Soviet interest in opium must have been a more detailed follow-up to an earlier approach by the Russians because the earlier account of Soviet overtures on the subject predates the delegation's visit to Moscow in late August 1977. Nepal's Prime Minister Bista subsequently assured the Ambassador that his government would not go into the opium production business. Despite these assurances, however, there are probably elements within the government that continue to favor nationally controlled opium cultivation as a source of peasant income and foreign exchange. Both the USSR and Yugoslavia reportedly indicated interest earlier in purchasing opium from Nepal. The Prime Minister's disclaimer does not necessarily preclude opium poppy cultivation to meet Nepal's domestic pharmaceutical needs.

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2 March 1978

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INTERESTING READING

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BRAZIL--*Police Combine Efforts in Combating Drug Trafficking*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp.30-32. "The secretary of security and the regional superintendent of the Federal Police have set up plans for a joint fight against drug trafficking and use in Rio de Janeiro. The government decided to fight relentlessly against narcotics trafficking and use because there are indications that the increase in the use of drugs is considerable."

*US *Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va., 22201.*

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2 March 1978

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BRAZIL--*'O ESTADO' Summarizes Drug-Related Crimes of Violence in Rio*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp.42-46. "Six important personages control major drug traffic throughout Brazil. Their names are the biggest and best-guarded secrets of the intricate world in which organized cocaine trade is carried on Violent deaths cover up traffic."

BRAZIL--*'O ESTADO' Surveys Usage, Drug Routes, Laboratories, Organization*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp. 47-50. "Crimes related to drug traffic result from the escalation of cocaine use in the big Brazilian metropolitan areas. During the early seventies international drug traffic had to be reorganized and the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo were picked as solutions; they became the basic stop-overs for cocaine on the road to the east coast of the United States and to Europe. The presence of enormous quantities of drugs in Rio and Sao Paulo, initially only 'in transit,' began to have a result . . . of wider spread of drug-use among Brazilians." The article contains an organizational chart showing a close correlation between the Brazilian lottery and the organization in Brazil involved in narcotics trafficking.

SUDAN--*Conference Discusses Drug Addiction, Control*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp. 70-72. Translation of an article by al-Rih Kashshah entitled "Serious Chat on Banks of Nile." The article is an account of the five-day conference of representatives from 17 Arab countries, seven international organizations, and seven Asian, African, and European countries which met in Khartoum last December to discuss the international narcotics problem. The fourth such conference is scheduled to convene in Libya next December.

FRANCE--*New Drug Connection Revealed, Explored*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp. 82-85. A translation of an article written by Marie-Therese Guichard and Jean-Marie Pontaut for *Le Point*. "In the geopolitics of narcotics, there have been the vagrants of Marseille, then the Chinese ants of Amsterdam . . . (and now) the Turkish immigrant workers of Germany As soon as one drug route is cut off, another is

2 March 1978

SECRET

born and one connection drives another away. This time the deadly poppy does not come only from Turkey but also from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The traffickers use the services of Turkish emigrant workers--500,000 from beyond the Rhine--who make up an army of anonymous and easy-to-please smugglers."

GREECE--*Largest Haul of Heroin to Date Confiscated at Athens Airport*--TNDD, No. L/7619, p. 86. "Athens General Security officers in late January arrested two Dutch women at Ellinikon Airport while they were transporting 16 kilograms of raw heroin valued at about \$3.4 million. The two Dutch women were traveling from Pakistan."

SWEDEN--*Welfare Minister Declares War on Narcotics Syndicates*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp. 88-89. "The proposition against narcotics abuse will have three points. The treatment sector will be expanded. Prisons are to be purged of drugs. Information furnished homes and schools, as well as places of employment, is to be intensified."

SWEDEN--*Latin American Convicted in Largest Cocaine Smuggling Case in Sweden*--TNDD, No. L/7619, pp. 92-93. "The drug--about one kilogram of pure cocaine--was cleverly hidden in an air duct (in the home of the Latin American) and was fished up with an electromagnet. (The packages of cocaine were attached to tin cans.) This, together with smaller finds in another case, shows that cocaine has now really arrived in Sweden."

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2 March 1978

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